ANALYZE SAFETY RISK. P2.2.1


           (a) Performance Objective.  determine and analyze the severity and likelihood of potential events associated with identified hazards, and will identify risk factors associated with unacceptable levels of severity or likelihood.
          (b) Design Expectations.
(1) The safety risk analysis process will include:
      (a) Existing safety risk controls,
      (b) Triggering mechanisms, and
      (c) Safety risk of reasonably likely outcomes from the existence of a hazard.
            1. Likelihood, and
            2. Severity.
                     Risk Analysis and Assessment. Process 2.2.1 and 2.2.2) The risk analysis and risk assessment components of the  SMS Framework use a conventional breakdown of risk by its two components: likelihood of occurrence of an injurious mishap and severity of the mishap related to an identified hazard, should it occur. 
A common tool for risk decision making and acceptance is a risk matrix similar to those in the U.S. Military Standard (MIL STD 882) and the ICAO Safety Management Manual (SMM)5. Appendix 3 shows a model, example, and discussion of safety risk matrices. 
Operators should develop a matrix that best represents their operational environment. Separate matrices with different risk acceptance criteria may also be developed for long-term versus short-term operations.
               Hazards in the system and its operating environment must be identified, documented, and controlled. It also requires that the analysis process used to define hazards consider all components of the system, based on the system description detailed above. The key question to ask during analysis of the system and its operation is what if? As with system and task descriptions, judgment is required to determine the adequate level of detail. While identification of every conceivable hazard would be unlikely, aviation service providers are expected to exercise due diligence in identifying significant and reasonably foreseeable hazards related to their operations.

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